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International Human Rights Law:
Principled, Double, or Absent Standards?
Dinah Shelton*
Introduction
Every legal system draws lines and makes distinctions in
adopting and applying its laws. In the United States, for example,
not all speech is protected by the First Amendment;' even speech
that is within its guarantees may be labeled political, artistic, or
commercial, with varying legal consequences attaching to these
judicially-created categories. 2 Classifications based on race are
proclaimed "suspect" and are subject to "strict scrutiny"3 while
. Dinah Shelton, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, The George
Washington University Law School.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I; see, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006)
(holding that because public employees speaking in their official capacities are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline); Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (noting that the First Amendment does not protect "true
threats"); R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-86 (1992) (noting that the
First Amendment does not protect "fighting words" from state regulation).
2. The United States Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment
affords a lesser degree of protection to commercial speech than noncommercial
speech. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989); Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978). Artistic speech is protected unless it is obscene. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)
(stating that examples of painting, music, and poetry are "unquestionably shielded"
by the First Amendment); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989)
("[Miusic, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First
Amendment."); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("[Eintertainment,
as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and
dramatic works fall within the First Amendment guarantee."); Kaplan v.
California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) ("[Plictures, films, paintings, drawings, and
engravings... have First Amendment protection."); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 865 (1997) (striking down portions of the Communications Decency Act
for failure to consider serious artistic value). But see Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 23 (1973) (holding that a state can prohibit an allegedly obscene work if "the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious... artistic.., value").
3. Ironically, the standard of strict scrutiny of measures directed at a single
racial group originated in the judgment upholding incarceration of Japanese-
Law and Inequality
other distinctions, such as those based on sex, are judged
according to less exacting, more deferential standards. 4
Prosecutors exercise discretion in deciding which criminal cases
should go forward, which charges should be dropped, and which
sentences should be sought.5 The government decides which
aliens are entitled to remain in the United States and which
should be deported. 6 Civil rights attorneys bring test cases and
devise litigation strategies to further their long range goal of
ensuring respect for constitutional and legislative guarantees.7
In each of these instances, those who are targets of
enforcement may assert that a double standard or arbitrariness is
being employed. Commercial publishers may argue that they
should have the same degree of protection as those engaged in
political speech. Criminal defendants or aliens facing deportation
may challenge action taken against them by claiming selective
prosecution. Women seeking equal protection may puzzle over the
absence of strict scrutiny for sex discrimination. Defendants in
civil rights litigation may protest that the behavior of others is just
as bad or worse. Other individuals and groups may note that they
have been unable to convince either legislatures or judges to adopt
or extend laws to include them at all.8
Lawmaking is undoubtedly and deliberately a political
process. Various interest groups press their agendas to obtain
favorable decisions on laws they propose or support. The process
Americans during World War II. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) ("[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.").
4. The Court has held on several occasions that classifications based on gender
are subject only to intermediate scrutiny. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Supreme Court reviews
economic and social legislation even more deferentially, requiring only that it rest
on "some rational basis." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002); United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
6. See, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471
(1999).
7. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE
DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT (1983) (reviewing civil rights litigation
challenging segregated transit in the United States).
8. On the limited recognition given same-sex relationships, see, for example,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240




may be distorted by powerful groups that intervene by offering
financial incentives or disincentives, threatening to withhold
support or block other goals of legislators, but majority decision-
making is the legitimate and accepted procedure for enacting laws.
Once laws are adopted, however, politics supposedly disappear
from enforcement and compliance; the fundamental principle of
equality before the law demands fair and principled enforcement,
with a hearing before an independent and impartial body.9 It is an
ideal that not even the most advanced legal systems always fulfill.
This Article will examine international human rights
standard-setting and enforcement procedures to assess the degree
to which they are unprincipled or employ a double standard. In
particular, it will test the assertion that the United Nations
("U.N.") has a double standard when it comes to enacting and
enforcing internationally recognized human rights. Thomas
Franck claimed two decades ago that "no indictment of the U.N.
has been made more frequently or with greater vehemence than
that it singles out Western and pro-Western states for obloquy,
while ignoring far worse excesses committed by socialist and Third
World nations."10  Third World commentators maintain the
opposite is true, asserting that the U.N. has focused
disproportionately on developing countries.11  While these
contradictory views may indicate that the U.N. is rather more
even-handed than is generally accepted, a perception of
politicization and lack of standards eroded the credibility and
legitimacy of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, 12 leading to its
9. The United States Constitution guarantees due process of law. U.S. CONST.
amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. Additionally, international human rights
instruments provide for the right, in full equality, to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of rights, obligations, and
criminal charges. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III)
art. 10, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316
(Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
10. THOMAS FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U.N.
DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S. CAN Do ABOUT IT 224 (1985).
11. "Longtime U.N. observers" view the U.N. as adopting resolutions
condemning violations mostly in developing countries, rather than in the Western
world. Thalif Deen, Human Rights: U.S. Double Standard Prompts UN Tactical
Twists, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 22, 2006, available at
http://ipsnews.net.interna.asp?idnews=26387.
12. See Joint NGO Statement on U.N. Reform-Presented to the 61st Session of




replacement in 2006 with the Human Rights Council.13
This Article first briefly describes the structure of
international institutions concerned with human rights. It then
presents an overview of the processes by which human rights
standards are adopted. It asserts that the process is closely
analogous to domestic lawmaking, with lobbyists, coalitions, and
compromises involved, but that a fundamental difference greatly
impacts enforcement: the adopted standards are not automatically
binding on the target states. Rather, each state must
subsequently approve them according to domestic constitutional
procedures. In this consensual international legal system, the law
cannot be enforced until the state accepts to be bound by the law.
Consequently, in the legal texts that states adopt, some rights do
not get included and others are limited or compromised.
Turning to enforcement, this Article describes the various
procedures to examine and promote compliance with human rights
norms, pointing out their weaknesses and limitations. The
international legal system lacks not only a legislature but a
developed court system, and it has only weak enforcement powers.
The primary deficiency of many human rights procedures,
especially at the U.N., is that states elect themselves to bodies
where they investigate and judge allegations against themselves
for violating the norms they have adopted. The result is self-
judging political bodies that inevitably reflect the policies of the
governments that sit on them. Governments generally respectful
of human rights take into account trade, security, ability to
influence, and other issues of national interest in deciding what
issues to examine and how to vote. Governments violating human
rights seek to avoid condemnation, often by lobbying for election to
the human rights bodies. Overall, the U.N. attention to human
rights matters is "like a dog's walking on his hinder legs. It is not
done well. But you are surprised to find it done at all."14
13. G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (Apr. 3, 2006). The Council
consists of forty-seven states elected by the General Assembly according to the
principle of "equitable geographic distribution." Id. 7. Africa and Asia each has
thirteen seats. Id. There are six seats for Eastern Europe, eight for Latin America
and the Caribbean, and seven for Western Europe and Others. Id. The Council is
authorized to meet three times a year for ten weeks but can also hold special
sessions. Id. 10. It reports directly to the General Assembly. Id. The Council's
mandate is to "be guided by the principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity
and non-selectivity, with a view to enhancing the promotion and protection of all."
Id. 4. The Council is also to consider and make recommendations on situations of
human rights violations, including gross and systematic violations. Id. 3.
14. Samuel Johnson used this phrase in 1763 to describe a woman preaching.
[Vol. 25:2470
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An optimist could see the increased politicization of human
rights at the former Human Rights Commission and U.N. General
Assembly as a back-handed tribute to the success of the human
rights movement in the past fifty years. Human rights violators
seek to manipulate the system because it has an impact and
constitutes a threat to their abusive exercise of power. As Egon
Schwelb noted in looking back over the first twenty-five years of
the U.N. practice, "neither the vagueness and generality of the
human rights clauses of the Charter nor the domestic jurisdiction
clause have prevented the U.N. from considering, investigating,
and judging concrete human rights situations, provided there was
a majority strong enough and wishing strongly enough to attempt
to influence the particular development."15
Despite the seemingly insurmountable political bias in the
structure of U.N. enforcement, this Article finds a principled basis
for much of the emphasis on examining certain countries and the
priority given to certain issues. It also acknowledges that the U.N.
Charter-based system does not afford a neutral examination of
alleged human rights violations before an independent body.
Global treaty bodies, in contrast to the U.N. Charter bodies, are
made up of independent experts, but their investigative and other
enforcement powers are generally severely constrained by states
during the treaty-drafting process.
This Article further asserts that only the regional human
rights systems offer the equivalent of domestic enforcement
procedures. They do so by creating independent commissions and
courts to which victims of human rights violations can complain.
Even these procedures are limited because cases can be filed only
against the states, not against individual perpetrators, and
remedies are restricted. In addition, all of the courts and
commissions depend on the political organs of the region to ensure
adequate personnel, financial support, and enforcement of their
decisions and judgments. The system works well for individual
cases but has grave limitations when it comes to addressing gross
and systematic human rights violations. Notably, neither Asia nor
the Middle East has any regional system in place. These regions
remain dependent on the work of the U.N. to promote and protect
JAMES BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON, VOL. 1: 1709-1765, at 325 (Marshall Waingrow
ed., Yale Univ. Press 1994) (1791). Johnson's attitude is not entirely absent from
the modern scene.
15. Egon Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights




This Article concludes that the further development of
independent bodies to which victims of violations and their
representatives can have open access is the best means to ensure
principled enforcement of human rights for the most vulnerable.
The U.N. Human Rights Council is unlikely to be an improvement
over the former Commission unless it establishes such an
independent advisory body, replacing the former Sub-Commission
of independent experts. The role of civil society, especially human
rights non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), will remain
critical in pressing for stronger human rights enforcement.
During the next twenty-five years, standard-setting will not be
concluded, but prevention, accountability, and redress will take
priority.
I. International Human Rights Law and Institutions
The international protection of human rights is a
fundamental aim of modern international law. Its development as
a distinct branch of international law is relatively recent, although
a limited set of legal norms designed to protect individuals against
mistreatment has been in existence since the beginnings of the law
of nations. 17  Even a cursory review of human rights law
demonstrates the rapid expansion of this field since the end of
World War II.18 During this period, nearly all global organizations
have adopted human rights standards and addressed human
rights violations by member states. 19  Supplementing global
efforts, regional organizations in the Americas, Europe, and Africa
have elaborated their own legal texts, institutions, and procedures
for the promotion and protection of human rights.20  As a
16. For a discussion of efforts to create a regional system in the Arab world, see
Mervat Rishmawi, The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights: A Step Forward?, 5
HuM. RTS. L. REV. 361, 361-62 (2005). For developments in Asia, see Vitit
Muntarbhorn, Asia, Human Rights and the New Millennium: Time for a Regional
Human Rights Charter?, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 407 (1998); Li-ann
Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: "Promises to Keep and
Miles to Go Before I Sleep" 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (1999).
17. For an extensive treatment of the history of human rights, see Louis B.
SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1973).
18. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
19. Id. at 19-20.
20. See generally THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1950-2000 (R.
Blackburn & J. Polakiewicz eds., 2000); RACHEL MURRAY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
[Vol. 25:2
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consequence no state today can or does claim that its treatment of
those within its jurisdiction is a matter solely of domestic concern.
A. The United Nations
The objectives of the U.N. as stated in Article 1 of its Charter
set the stage for the organization's human rights work. The
language of the article reveals concern for equality and non-
discrimination:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security...
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples...
3. To achieve international cooperation.., in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion .... 21
Other provisions in the U.N. Charter contributed to placing
human rights firmly on the organization's agenda. 22 Articles 55
and 56 create binding, if vague, obligations for all member states. 23
The organs of the U.N.24 have given content to these obligations
AFRICA: FROM THE OAU TO THE AFRICAN UNION (2004); FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA
FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (2003); Christof
Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter, 108
PENN. ST. L. REV. 679 (2004); Dinah Shelton, The Inter-American Human Rights
System, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 121 (Hurst Hannum
ed., 4th ed. 2004). The European Union and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe also address human rights issues, but the topic is not the
primary mandate of either organization, and only brief mention of them is made in
this Article. See Activities of the European Union-Human Rights,
http://europa.eu/pollrights/indexen.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2007); OSCE:
Activities-Human Dimension, http://www.osce.org/activities/18805.html (last
visited Mar. 14, 2007).
21. U.N. Charter art. 1 (emphasis added).
22. See id. pmbl.; id. arts. 1, 13, 55, 56, 62, 68, 76 (mentioning human rights).
For a discussion of U.N. activities on human rights, see generally JOHN PETERS
HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE
(1984); INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Irwin Cotler
& F. Pearl Eliandis eds., 1992); THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Philip Alston & Frederic Megret eds., 1992).
23. U.N. Charter art. 55 (establishing that the U.N. "shall promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"); id. art. 56 ("[AIll
Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with
the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.").
24. "The General Assembly, the plenary body of the United Nations, shall...
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and sought to ensure compliance with them by adopting a set of
detailed human rights treaties and other legal instruments. 25
The main U.N. organs concerned with human rights,
including the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the
Human Rights Council, consist of governmental representatives of
the member states.26 Only the former Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
(renamed in 1999 the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights) was a body of independent experts,
nominated by states and elected by the Human Rights
Commission.27 The decision to transform the Commission into the
Council was coupled with the demise of the Sub-Commission. 28
The U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights is an independent
official, with a mandate to act on behalf of the organization and to
administer the office for human rights.29 The Charter guarantees
independence for the secretariat working under her
initiate studies and make recommendations to assist in the realization of human
rights and fundamental freedoms." Id. art. 13, l(b). The Security Council's
primary responsibility for peace and security includes a mandate to take action in
response to any situation it concludes is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression, including violations of human rights. Id. arts. 39-42. The
Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC"), consisting of seventy-six U.N. member
states, is authorized to made recommendations to promote respect for and
observance of human rights and to draft conventions on the issue. Id. art. 62.
Pursuant to the directive in the Charter, ECOSOC established the former U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, replaced in 2006 with the Human Rights Council.
G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 13. The Commission on the Status of Women, created
in 1946, consists of forty-five governmental representatives. ECOSOC Res. 2/11,
U.N. Doc. E/RES/2/11 (June 21, 1946).
25. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 9; ICCPR, supra note 9.
26. See U.N. Charter arts. 9, 23; G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 13, 7.
27. The Commission on Human Rights created the Sub-Commission at its first
session in 1946. U.N. Charter art. 68. The General Assembly abolished the
Commission and replaced it with the Council in 2006. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note
13. "In decision 1/102 of 30 June 2006, the Human Rights Council decided to
extend exceptionally for one year, subject to the review to be undertaken by the
Council in conformity with General Assembly resolution 60/251, the mandates and
mandate-holders of the Sub-Commission." Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights Home Page, http://www.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/subcom (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
28. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Home Page, supra
note 27.
29. See G.A. Res. 48/141, U.N. Doc. AIRES/48/141 (Dec. 20, 1993). The General
Assembly created the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights in 1993, with a
mandate to promote observance of the Charter of the U.N., the UDHR, and other
human rights instruments. Id. 1, 3.
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administration,30 but it has been subject to outside political
pressure at times.31 Finally, the fifteen judges of the International
Court of Justice ("I.C.J."), the "principal judicial organ of the
United Nations," 32 have jurisdiction to decide inter-state cases and
issue advisory opinions. 33 Relatively few cases involving human
rights matters have come before the court,34 but litigating states
have insisted on the human rights and duties reflected in the U.N.
Charter.3 5
The U.N.'s affiliated specialized agencies have addressed
human rights as well. 36 The International Labor Organization
("ILO"), the oldest organization concerned with human rights,
focuses on rights related to employment, including "[working]
conditions of freedom and dignity,"37 trade union freedoms, 38
freedom from forced labor,39 and freedom from child labor.40 The
30. U.N. Charter art. 100.
31. See LAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES (1990) (describing pressure
placed on U.N. human rights machinery during the 1980s).
32. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 1.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C. J. 3 (Oct. 7); Legal Consequences for
States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, Advisory Opinion, 1971
I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
35. See, e.g., Memorial of United States; United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings 182 (Jan. 12, 1980)
(asserting that the existence of fundamental rights for all human beings, with a
corresponding duty on the part of every state to respect and observe them, are
reflected in Articles 1, 55, and 56 of the U.N. Charter).
36. Specialized agencies are legally independent organizations with separate
membership from the U.N. created by their own constitutions or charters. Agencies
such as the International Labor Organization ("ILO"), the Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO"), the Food and Agriculture Organization,
and the World Health Organization ('WHO") are directly involved in human rights
standard-setting and compliance monitoring. See generally Stephen P. Marks, The
Complaint Procedure of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note
20, at 107; Lee Swepston, Human Rights Complaint Procedures of the International
Labor Organization, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra
note 20, at 89. The preamble of the Constitution of the WHO states that
"enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief,
economic or social condition." Constitution of the World Health Organization
pmbl., July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 6279, 14 U.N.T.S. 145.
37. Convention Concerning Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) (No.
111), June 15, 1960, 362 U.N.T.S. 31.
38. Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize (No. 98), July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17.
39. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor (No. 28), June 28,
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ILO has concluded more than 180 conventions and has highly
developed monitoring procedures. 41  The U.N. Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO") has adopted
conventions on educational 42 and cultural rights 43 and adopted the
first international instrument to address the impact of
biotechnology on human rights. 44
B. Regional Organizations
Following World War II, the widespread movement for
human rights also led newly created or reformed regional
organizations to add human rights to their agendas. The stalled
efforts of the U.N. on one or more human rights treaties to
complete the international bill of rights45 revealed that global
compliance mechanisms would not be strong. The regional
systems, therefore, focused on the creation of procedures of
redress, establishing control machinery to supervise the
implementation and enforcement of the guaranteed rights.46 All of
the regional institutions drew inspiration 47 from the human rights
1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55; Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor (No.
105), June 25, 1957, S. TREATY Doc. No. 88-11, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
40. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (No. 182), June 17, 1999, 2133
U.N.T.S. 161, 38 I.L.M. 1207.
41. See Swepston, supra note 36, at 90.
42. UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960,
429 U.N.T.S. 93.
43. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-1, 249 U.N.T.S. 215; Second
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, Mar. 6, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769.
44. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights,
UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 29, at 41 (Nov. 11, 1997), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/001O/O01O96/109687eb.pdf. The U.N. General
Assembly endorsed the Declaration. G.A. Res. 53/152, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/152
(Dec. 9, 1998).
45. See Human Rights Commission, Celebrating the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (2001), http://www.hrc.co.nz/index.php?p=451 (noting that the U.N.
Covenants were not completed for nearly two decades after adoption of the UDHR).
46. See Message to Europeans, adopted by the Congress of Europe, May 8-10,
1948, quoted in Council of Europe, Report of the Control System of the European
Convention on Human Rights 4 (H(92)14) (Dec. 1992) ("We desire a Charter of
Human Rights guaranteeing liberty of thought, assembly and expression as well as
the right to form a political opposition; We desire a Court of Justice with adequate
sanctions for the implementation of this Charter.").
47. See generally ARTHUR HENRY ROBERTSON & JOHN GRAHAM MERRILLS,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HuMAN RIGHTS (1996).
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provisions of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("UDHR"),48 but different historical and political
factors encouraged each region to focus on specific human rights
issues.
1. The Americas
The Americas had a tradition of regional approaches to
international issues, including human rights, growing out of
regional solidarity developed during the movements for
independence. 49 This history of concern led the Organization of
American States ("OAS") to refer to human rights in its Charter,
opened for signature in Bogota, Colombia, in 1948.50 In the
Charter, "the American States proclaim the fundamental rights of
the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or
sex" among the principles to which they are committed.5 1 Former
Article 13, now Article 17, declares that "each State has the right to
develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally,"
but prescribes that "in this free development, the State shall respect
the rights of the individual and the principles of universal
morality."52
The OAS Charter did not define "the fundamental rights of the
individual," nor did it create any institution to promote their
observance. 53  However, the same diplomatic conference that
adopted the OAS Charter also proclaimed the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man,5 4 some months before the U.N.
48. G.A. Res. 217A (11), supra note.9.
49. As early as 1907 some states in the region created the Central American
Court of Justice. The court had jurisdiction over cases of "denial of justice" between
a government and a national of another state, if the cases were of an international
character or concerned alleged violations of a treaty or convention. See M. HUDSON,
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 49-50 (1943).
50. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. The Charter has been amended by several Protocols: the
Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 721
U.N.T.S. 324; the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 5, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 66,
119 U.N.T.S. 3, 25 I.L.M. 529; the Protocol of Washington, Dec. 14, 1992, OEA/Ser.
A/2 Add. 3, 33 I.L.M. 1005; and the Protocol of Managua, June 10, 1993, OEAISer. A/2
Add. 3, 33 I.L.M. 1009).
51. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 50, art. 3(1).
52. Id. art. 17.
53. Id. art. 3.
54. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948,
OEA/Ser.L/VI1.4, rev. 10, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 17 (2004) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS].
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completed the UDHR. 55 Promulgated in the form of a simple
conference resolution, this instrument proclaims an extensive
catalog of human rights and gives definition to the Charter's
general commitment to human rights. 56 In 1969 the OAS adopted
the American Convention on Human Rights.57 Other human rights
treaties establishing standards for the region have followed.5 s
The OAS discharges its functions through various organs,
including its two primary political bodies, the General Assembly
and Permanent Council, both of which have jurisdiction to deal with
human rights matters. 59 In 1959, the OAS created the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, 60 conferring on it
responsibility for promoting human rights in the hemisphere. The
Commission began accepting communications and issuing reports
on human rights violations. 61 It continues these functions with
respect to OAS member states but also has responsibility for
monitoring compliance with the human rights treaties adopted by
55. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 54, at 6.
56. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 54.
57. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 54, at
27.
58. These treaties include the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519, reprinted in BASIC
DOCUMENTS, supra note 54, at 91; Additional Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17,
1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note
54, at 73; Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. No. 73, 29 I.L.M. 1447, reprinted in BASIC
DOCUMENTS, supra note 54, at 87; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women, June 9, 1994, 27 U.S.T.
3301, 33 I.L.M. 1534, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 54, at 111; Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1429, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 54, at 101; Inter-American
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with
Disabilities, June 7, 1999, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 54, at 123.
59. See BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 54, at 17.
60. Org. of Am. States, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Santiago, Chile, Aug. 12-18, 1959, 55 AM. J. INT'L. L. 537 (1961). The
Statute of the Commission described it as an autonomous entity of the OAS
functioning to promote respect for human rights. Statute of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights art. 1, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note
54, at 131. In 1967, the Protocol of Buenos Aires amended the Charter to make the
Commission a principal organ of the OAS. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 54, at 9.
61. In 1965, the Commission's competence was expanded to accept
communications, request information from governments, and make
recommendations to bring about more effective observance of human rights.
Second Special Inter-American Conference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Nov. 17-30,
1965, 60 AM. J. INTL. L. 445, 458 (1965).
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the OAS.62 The Inter-American Court on Human Rights, along with
the Commission, monitors compliance with the obligations of state
parties to the American Convention on Human Rights. 63
2. Europe
The European system, the first to be fully operational, began
when ten Western European states signed the Statute of the
Council of Europe on May 5, 1949.64 After suffering the atrocities
of World War II, Europe felt compelled to press for international
human rights guarantees as part of European reconstruction.
Faith in Western European traditions of democracy, the rule of
law, and individual rights inspired belief that a regional system
could avoid future conflict and stem post-war revolutionary
impulses supported by the Soviet Union. 65 Article 3 of the Statute
provides that "every Member of the Council of Europe must accept
the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all
persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental
freedoms... "66 The end of the Cold War enabled Central and
Eastern European nations to join the Council of Europe after
declaring their acceptance of the principles spelled out in Article
3;67 total membership now stands at forty-six states.68
62. Id. at 459 (stating that the Commission must monitor compliance with
human rights treaties).
63. Inter-American Court of Human Rights . Home Page,
http://oas.org/OASpagelhumanrights.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
64. Statute of the Council of Europe art.3, May 5, 1949, Europ. T.S. No. 1. The
original members were Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Id.
65. In the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights, the
contracting parties declare that they are:
[r]eaffirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which
are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best
maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the
other by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights
upon which they depend.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, Europ. T.S. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]. For a discussion of the ECHR's history,
see J.G. Merrills, The Council of Europe (I): The European Convention on Human
Rights, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 287-89 (Rhija Hanski & Markku Suksi eds., 1999) ("Many statesmen of the
immediate post-war epoch had been in resistance movements or in prison during
the Second World War and were acutely conscious of the need to prevent any
recrudescence of dictatorship in Western Europe."). Merrills also views the
emergence of the East-West conflict as a stimulus to closer ties in Europe. Id. at
287-88.
66. Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 64, art. 3.
67. Vienna Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Council of
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As the first human rights system, the European Convention
on Human Rights ("ECHR") initially contained a short list of civil
and political rights. 69  Over time, ECHR Protocols 70  and
independent agreements have added additional guarantees. 71 The
Contracting Parties to the European Convention thus have
repeatedly lengthened the list of guaranteed rights. The European
system was also the first to create an international commission
and court 72 for the protection of human rights and to create a
Europe, Oct. 9, 1993, reprinted in D. HUBER, A DECADE WHICH MADE HISTORY: THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE 1989-1999, at 247 (1999); see also Comm. of Ministers,
Declaration on Compliance with Commitments Accepted by Member States of the
Council of Europe, 95th Sess. (Nov. 10, 1994), reprinted in Council of Europe,
Information Sheet No. 35, at 146 (1995); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & DINAH
SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 24 (4th ed. 1995) (1982).
68. About the Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about-Coe (last
visited Apr. 17, 2007).
69. See ECHR, supra note 65.
70. The Council of Europe has adopted fourteen protocols to the ECHR,
expanding the list of guaranteed civil and political rights. Protocol No. 1 to the
ECHR, Mar. 20, 1951, Europ. T.S. 9 (adding a right to property and a right to
education; requiring the Contracting Parties to hold free and secret elections at
reasonable intervals); Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR, Sept. 16, 1963, Europ. T.S. 46
(prohibiting deprivation of liberty for failure to comply with contractual obligations,
guaranteeing the right to liberty of movement, and barring forced exile of nationals
and the collective expulsion of aliens); Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR, Apr. 28, 1983,
Europ. T.S. 114 (abolishing the death penalty except during wartime); Protocol No.
7 to the ECHR, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. T.S. 117 (according aliens various due
process safeguards before they may be expelled from a country where they reside;
providing for rights of appeal in criminal proceedings, compensation in cases of
miscarriage of justice, protection against double jeopardy, and equality of rights
and responsibilities between spouses); Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR, Nov. 4, 2000,
Europ. T.S. 177 (augmenting the non-discrimination guarantee in Article 14 of the
ECHR by providing that "the enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground" and that "no one shall be
discriminated against by any public authority"); Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR, May
3, 2002, Europ. T.S. 187 (abolishing the death penalty under all circumstances);
Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR, May 13, 2004, Europ. T.S. 194 (envisaging a revision
of judicial procedures).
71. See, e.g., European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. 35; European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. 126 [hereinafter Torture Convention];
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Nov. 5, 1992, Europ. T.S.
148; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995,
Europ. T.S. 15; Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997,
Europ. T.S. 164.
72. See Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in
Europe, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 100 (2003).
The Commission acquired its competence to receive individual petitions in
1955, after six states accepted the right of petition. Many states took
decades to accept the right of individual petition. The U.K. filed its first
declaration on 14 January 1966. France and Greece did not accept the
right of petition until 1981, while Turkey presented its acceptance only in
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procedure for individual denunciations of human rights
violations. 73 The role of the victim was initially limited and
admissibility requirements were stringent. 74 As the system has
matured, however, the institutional structures and normative
guarantees have been considerably strengthened. 75
3. Africa
In Africa, as states emerged from colonization, their human
rights agenda focused on self-determination and racism.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which
entered into force October 21, 1986, established a system for
the protection and promotion of human rights that was
designed to function within the institutional framework of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a regional
intergovernmental organization that came into being in 1963
and was replaced in 1999 by the African Union. 76
The main objectives of the OAU included ridding the continent of
the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid; promoting
unity and solidarity among African States; coordinating and
intensifying cooperation for development; safeguarding the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States; and
promoting international cooperation within the framework of the
U.N.77 The end of colonialism and the ascent of democratic rule in
Southern Africa has led to a larger role for human rights issues in
the new African Union and to the adoption of a Protocol for the
establishment of an African Court of Human Rights.7 8
II. Standard-setting: Universal or Variable Norms?
The U.N. Charter did not define the term "human rights" but
left the member states to give it meaning, which they began doing
when the General Assembly adopted the UDHR without dissent on
December 10, 1948. 79 The same year, the General Assembly also
1987.
Id. at 100 n.22.
73. Id. at 100.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 100-02.
76. BUERGENTHAL & SHELTON, supra note 67, at 29.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 29-30.
79. UDHR, supra note 9. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
indicates that in interpreting treaties, any subsequent agreement or practice of the
parties regarding its interpretation or the application of its provisions shall be
taken into account to give meaning to its terms. Vienna Convention on the Law of
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adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide.80 Standard-setting continued with a focus on non-
discrimination and equality for disadvantaged groups.81 The 1965
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination ("CERD") was the first of a series of treaties
addressing equal rights.8 2  The U.N. subsequently adopted
instruments concerning women, children, migrant workers, and
the disabled.8 3 The UDHR became two Covenants, one on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the other on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights ("ICESCR").84 The standard-setting process
continues as member states place items on the agenda for action.
Standard-setting will not end, because new problems arise, and
fears of a "devalued currency" are probably overstated given the
need to obtain consensus before a new instrument can be adopted.
From the beginning, the moral leadership of key states has
been important,8 5 but, as John Humphrey has noted, "[t]he
relatively strong human rights provisions in the Charter through
which they run, as someone has said, like a golden thread, were
largely, and appropriately, the result of determined lobbying by
non-governmental organizations at the San Francisco
Conference."86  NGOs and international civil servants working
Treaties art. 31(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
80. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
81. BUERGENTHAL & SHELTON, supra note 67, at 20.
82. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar.
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 [hereinafter CERD].
83. BUERGENTHAL & SHELTON, supra note 67, at 20-21.
84. Id. at 18; see ICCPR, supra note 9; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter ICESCR].
85. The proposal to have the U.N. organization ensure respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms without discrimination was initially submitted by
Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. Amendments and Comments on
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, APRIL 25 TO JUNE 26,
1945-SELECTED DOCUMENTS 87, 93 (1946). Uruguay proposed that the
organization endorse the essential rights of mankind, internationally established
and guaranteed. Id. at 110. See also JOHN P. HUMPHREY, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 14-17 (1984) (acknowledging the key role
of Panama in efforts to draft an international bill of rights); PAUL GORDON LAUREN,
THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS SEEN 217 (1998)
(discussing the role of key states and specifically the role of Panama in drafting the
International Bill on Human Rights).
86. John P. Humphrey, The International Law of Human Rights in the Middle
Twentieth Century, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER
ESSAYS 75, 83 (Maarten Bos ed., 1973).
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exclusively on human rights issues are clearly a major factor in
agenda setting. Felice Gaer has called human rights NGOs the
engine for virtually every advance made by the U.N. in the field of
human rights since its founding.8 7 One example is Amnesty
International's campaign against the death penalty,8 8 which led to
the drafting of three treaties: the Second Protocol to the ICCPR,8 9
the Sixth Protocol to the ECHR, 90 and the Inter-American Protocol
to Abolish the Death Penalty. 91 A multiplicity of actors with
divergent interests participate in any negotiations for new human
rights norms. Successful negotiations on human rights issues thus
typically involve coalition building among states and nonstate
actors. Negotiators may make trade-offs between the ideal and
the possible; often the form and the content of the negotiated
instrument reflect compromise and efforts to achieve consensus.
The media also plays a significant role in identifying human
rights issues that need resolution.92 By documenting abuses, the
media often generates public outrage that helps create coalitions
of NGOs and others to mobilize action.93  Compelling media
imagery can thus bring an issue forward.94
During the standard-setting process one state may take a
leadership role, sometimes out of conviction or sometimes because
of domestic political pressure after national reforms have been
instituted to address particular problems. Usually, however,
governments are motivated by strategic and political
considerations or historic rivalries. This can be useful; political
motivation does not minimize real human rights problems. At the
same time, the political motivation may create suspicion about the
need for action, thereby undermining any effort to change state
87. Felice D. Gaer, Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments
at the UN, in NGOS, THE UN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51, 51-53 (Thomas G.
Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996).
88. See generally Johanna K. Eyiolfsdottir, Amnesty International: A Candle of
Hope, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS 855
(Gudmundur Alfredsson et al. eds., 2001) (discussing generally the role of Amnesty
International in influencing the drafting of treaties against the death penalty).
89. Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Aiming at the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/128 (Jan. 30, 1990).
90. Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR, supra note 70.
91. Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty, supra note 58.
92. See Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, in MANAGING GLOBAL ISSUES 424, 439-





behavior. It also may make the target state more intransigent
when hostile states or traditional enemies raise issues. For this
and other reasons, states often are reluctant to raise human rights
matters, which constitute only one of many matters of
international concern for them.
NGOs have nonetheless successfully aligned with medium
and small powers to achieve considerable success. Groups
representing torture survivors and other victims of abuse
succeeded in obtaining provisions on victim compensation in the
Statute of the International Criminal Court through alliance with
key states, such as France and Canada. 95 In subsequent human
rights negotiations, leadership of "repeat players," those with
expertise and an impartial commitment to human rights, has
enhanced the strategy of coalition building.96
It may be questioned whether the role of NGOs introduces a
Western bias into standard-setting. Civil society and NGOs are
both more common and better funded in Western countries than
they are in other parts of the world.97 This may have an impact on
the U.N.'s work, especially when NGOs can fund investigations by
U.N. experts who are denied support by the U.N. itself. If the
system is open and transparent, however, this does not necessarily
lead to bias in the results, especially when the majority of states in
the organization, which ultimately decide whether to adopt
proposals, come from other regions of the world. In addition, it is
less and less the case that Western NGOs predominate; the
creation of human rights institutions has empowered local and
regional NGOs throughout the world. In the twenty years of the
African Charter, the number of NGOs accredited to the African
Commission has grown to 370.98 During its Fortieth Session, the
Commission accredited sixteen additional NGOs, all but two of
which are African organizations. 99 Indeed, it is far more common
today to hear Western countries complaining of bias in favor of
developing countries' human rights agenda than it is for
developing countries to complain about the U.N. human rights
95. See Gaer, supra note 87, at 55-57.
96. See Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global Governance:
Analytical Approaches and Dimensions, in NGOS, THE UN, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 87, at 17, 31.
97. Id.
98. Twenty-First Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples'Rights, 14-15, African Union Doc EX.CL/322 (X) (Jan. 25-26, 2007).
99. Id. 14.
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agenda. Controversies over the right to development, 100 the right
to a safe and healthy environment, 10 1 and norms for transnational
companies 02 reflect a North-South split in priorities and concepts
of rights.
Like the U.N. system, regional organizations have evolved
over time, increasing the protections afforded and the rights
guaranteed. The European, Inter-American, and African systems
have all expanded their guarantees through the adoption
ofprotocols and other human rights instruments, each one building
on the normative advances at the U.N. and in other regions.
0 3
The Inter-American system, for example, has concluded the Inter-
American Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Torture; 0 4 the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights; 0 5 the Second Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty; 0 6 the
100. See, e.g., Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for
the 1980s?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 438 (1981) (arguing the right to property and
development is a fundamental right); World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-
15, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, at 5, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.157/23 (referring to the right to development as "a universal and
inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights").
101. See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights: Final Report of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, at 258, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (July 6, 1994) (asserting that there is a right to a safe and
healthy environment).
102. See ECOSOC Sub-Comm. on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) (recognizing the duty of
transnational corporations to promote and respect human rights). The Commission
responded by noting that it had not requested the norms and that "as a draft
proposal" the Sub-Commission's report had no legal standing. Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations & Related Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN4/Dec/2004/116 (Apr. 20, 2004). Therefore, the Sub-
Commission "should not perform any monitoring function in this regard." Id. In
2005, the Commission, by resolution, requested the Secretary-General to appoint a
special representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations
and other business enterprises. ECOSOC Res. 2005/69, at 68, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/L.11/Add.7 (Apr. 20, 2005). No reference was made to the Sub-
Commissions Norms. See id.
103. See BUERGENTHAL & SHELTON, supra note 67, at 24-31(summarizing the
development of regional human rights organizations throughout the world).
104. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, supra note 58.
105. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 58.
106. Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty, supra note 58.
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Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and
Eradication of Violence against Women; 0 7 the Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons; 108 and the Inter-
American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities. 109 It has drafted
a Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, but the text has
not yet been adopted. 110
It is notable that virtually all the legal instruments in the
various regional systems refer to the UDHR and the U.N.
Charter,"' providing a measure of uniformity in the fundamental
107. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication
of Violence against Women, supra note 58.
108. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note
58.
109. Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, supra note 58.
110. Press Release V, Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, Press Communique
of 3/97, O.A.S. Doc OEA/Ser.LIV/II.98, Doc.7 rev. (Mar. 7, 1997), reprinted in
O.A.S., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1997, at 1081.
111. Only the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man does not
mention the UDHR, because it was adopted prior to the completion of the UDHR.
See American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 54. The
American Declaration indicates its origin in the "repeated occasions" on which the
American States had "recognized that the essential rights of man are not derived
from the fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes
of his personality." Id. pmbl. The European system, "considering the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights," provides that the "like-minded" governments of
Europe have resolved "to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of
certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration." ECHR, supra note 65,
pmbl. The Preamble to the American Convention also cites the UDHR, as well as
referring to the OAS Charter, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, and other international and regional instruments not referred to by name.
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 57, pmbl. The drafting history
of the American Convention shows that the states involved utilized the ECHR, the
UDHR, and the Covenants in deciding upon the American Convention guarantees
and institutional structure. See BUERGENTHAL & SHELTON, supra note 67, at 41-
43. The African Charter mentions the Charter of the U.N. and the UDHR in
connection with the pledge made by the African States to promote international
cooperation. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights pmbl., reprinted in
OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 20, at 803. In the Charter's Preamble, the African States
also reaffirm in sweeping fashion "their adherence to the principles of human and
peoples' rights and freedoms contained in the declarations, conventions and other
instruments adopted by the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of
Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations." Id. The Revised Arab Charter on
Human Rights was adopted with a preamble "reaffirming the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." League of Arab
States, Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, available at
http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/loas2005.html.
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guarantees and a reinforcement of the universal character of the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.112 The
rights contained in the treaties also reflect the human rights
norms set forth in other global human rights declarations and
conventions, in particular the U.N. ICCPR 113 and ICESCR.114 The
most recently adopted regional instrument, the 2004 Revised Arab
Charter,11 5 was drafted and approved in part to bring the regional
norms more into conformity with global standards.1 16
In addition, as each successive system has been created it has
looked to the normative instruments and jurisprudence of those
systems founded earlier. Provisions regarding choice of law and
canons of interpretation contained in the regional instruments
have led to considerable convergence in fundamental human
rights norms and their application. All of the systems have a
growing case law detailing the rights and duties enunciated in the
basic instruments. The jurisprudence of the regional human
rights bodies has thus become a major source of human rights law.
In many instances this case law reflects a confluence of the
different substantive protections in favor of broad human rights
protections. In other instances, differences in treaty terms or
approach have resulted in a rejection of precedent from other
systems.1 1 7 In general, the judges and the commissioners have
been willing to substantiate or give greater authority to their
interpretations of rights by referencing not only their own prior
case law but also the decisions of other global and regional bodies.
Some decisions cross-reference specific articles of other
instruments. The European Court of Human Rights has utilized
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR to extend the application of Article 10 of
the EHCR to cover artistic expression.118 It has referred to the
112. See American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man pmbl., supra
note 54 ("[The international protection of the rights of man should be the principal
guide of an evolving American law.").
113. ICCPR, supra note 9.
114. ICESCR, supra note 84.
115. The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, supra note 111.
116. See Rishmawi, supra note 16.
117. For example, the European and Inter-American courts take very different
approaches to their remedial powers based on the different language of their
respective treaties. In case law, the Inter-American court has also rejected the
more stringent European restrictions on rights. See Compulsory Membership in an
Ass'n Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, 5 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) No. 5, at 15 (Nov. 13, 1985), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
docs/opiniones/seriea_05_ing.pdf.
118. See Muller, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1988).
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U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child in regard to
education. 119 It has also referred to both the ICCPR and the
American Convention in regard to the right to a name as part of
Article 8 of the ECHR.12° Most well known is Soering v. United
Kingdom, where the court found that the obligation not to
extradite someone who might face torture 21 is implicit in Article 3
of the ECHR. 122
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights also frequently
uses other international court decisions and international human
rights instruments to interpret and apply Inter-American norms.
It has referred to the EHCR,123 the ICCPR, other U.N. treaties, 24
and decisions of the European Human Rights Commission and the
European Court.1 25 It has stated that it will use cases decided by
the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights
119. See Costello-Roberts v. U.K., 247C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 50, 58 (1993).
120. See Burghartz v. Switz., 280B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 19, 28 (1994).
121. Torture Convention, supra note 71, art. 3.
122. See Soering v. U.K., 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1989) ('The fact that a
specialised treaty should spell out in detail a specific obligation attaching to the
prohibition of torture does not mean that an essentially similar obligation is not
already inherent in the general terms of Article 3 of the European Convention.").
The former Commission had stated that it found it useful in interpreting the EHCR
to refer to provisions in other international legal instruments for the protection of
human rights, especially those that contain broader guarantees. See Gestra v.
Italy, App. No. 21072/92, 80B Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.& Rep. 89, 93 (1995).
123. See, e.g., Compulsory Membership, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, at 11-
13; Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Corr., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 7, at 6 (ser.
A) (Aug. 29, 1986), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/
seriea_07_ ing.pdf.
124. See Compulsory Membership, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, at 11-14;
Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, at 13-14 (Jan. 19, 1984), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_04_ing.pdf.
125. See Caballero Delgado & Santana Case (Preliminary Objections), Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 17, at 14 (Jan. 21, 1994), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec-l7_ing 5B1%5D.pdf;
Gangaram Panday Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 16, at 9 (Jan. 21, 1994),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec 16_- ing%5Bl%5D;
The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the Am. Convention on Human Rights, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 6, at 5 (May 9, 1986), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_06_ing.pdf; Compulsory
Membership, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, at 11-13, 19-20; Proposed
Amendments, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, at 15; Viviana Gallardo v. Gov't of
Costa Rica, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 101, at 3, 7-8 (Nov. 13, 1982), available
at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_101_81_ing.pdf; The Effect of
Reservations on the Entry into Force of the Am. Convention, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser.A) No. 2, at 8 (Sept. 24, 1982) available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_02-ing.pdf.
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Committee when they augment rights protection 26 and has
indicated a commitment not to incorporate restrictions from other
systems.127
Inter-American Commission and court decisions in turn
provide extensive jurisprudence on due process,1 28 conditions of
detention and treatment of detainees,1 29 legality of amnesty
laws,1 30 rape as torture,1 31 disappearances, 32 obligations to ensure
respect for rights,133 direct applicability of norms,1 34 exhaustion of
local remedies, 135 burden and standard of proof,136 admissibility of
evidence,13 7 and the general doctrine of interpretation of human
rights treaties. 138 The African Commission has drawn upon these
and other standards in deciding cases before it.139 The
Commission has adopted several doctrines from European and
Inter-American case law: presumption of the truth of the
allegations from the silence of government,1 40 the notion of
126. See Compulsory Membership, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, at 15 ("[If
in the same situation both the American Convention and another international
treaty are applicable, the rule most favorable to the individual must prevail.").
127. See id. at 14 (stating that the comparison of the "American Convention with
the provisions of other international instruments" should never be used to read into
the "Convention restrictions that are not grounded in its text.").
128. See Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Inter.-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) No. 9 (Oct. 6, 1987).
129. See Gangaram Panday Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 16; Viviana
Gallardo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 101.
130. See Enactment of the Amnesty Law and El Sal.'s Int'l Commitments, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.LV/II.85, doc. 28 rev. (1994).
131. See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Sal., Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OAS/Ser.L/V/II.46, doc. 23, rev. 1 (1978).
132. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29,
1988).
133. See Gangaram Panday Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 16.
134. See BUERGENTHAL & SHELTON, supra note 67, at 365-430.
135. See Caballero Delgado & Santana Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 17,
at 15.
136. See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 4.
137. See id.
138. See Caballero Delgado & Santana Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 17,
at 5-8.
139. See COMPILATION OF DECISIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE AFRICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS (Inst. for Human Rights & Dev. ed,
1999) [hereinafter COMPILATION OF DECISIONS].
140. See, e.g., Communications Nos. 59/91, 60/91, 87/93, 101/93, 74/92. For
example:
The African Commission... has set out the principle that where
allegations of human rights abuse go uncontested by the government
concerned, even after repeated notifications, the Commission must decide
on the facts provided by the complainant and treat those facts as given.
Law and Inequality [Vol. 25:2
continuing violations,' 4 ' continuity of obligations in spite of a
change of government, 142 state responsibility for failure to act, 43
and the presumption that the state is responsible for custodial
injuries. 144 In sum, standard-setting is a dynamic process of cross-
referencing and progression in the development of human rights
norms; the standard appears to be a single one, although there is
diversity outside the core of protections.
III. Enforcement: Taking Up Human Rights Violations
Human rights governance started with a revolutionary
This principle conforms with the practice of other human rights
adjudicatory bodies and the Commission's duty to protect human rights.
Communications Nos. 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, Free Legal Assistance Group,
Lawyers' Comm. for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme,
Les T6moins de Jehovah/Zaire, in COMPILATION OF DECISIONS, supra note 139, at
52-58. Article 42 of the Regulations of the Inter-American Commission allows it to
presume the facts in the petition are true if the government fails to respond to the
complaint. See BUERGENTHAL & SHELTON, supra note 67, at 660.
141. See, e.g., Communication No. 142/94, Njoka v. Kenya, at 13; Case No. 39/90,
Pagnoulle v. Cameroon.
142. In a communication against Malawi the Commission held:
Principles of international law stipulate.., that a new government
inherits the previous government's international obligations, including the
responsibility for the previous government's mismanagement. The change
of government in Malawi does not extinguish the present claim before the
Commission. Although the present government of Malawi did not commit
the human rights abuses complained of, it is responsible for the reparation
of these abuses.
Communications Nos. 64/92, 68/92, 78/92, Amnesty Int'l v. Malawi, reprinted in
COMPILATION OF DECISIONS, supra note 139, at 33 ; see Communications Nos.
83/92, 88/9, 91/93, Degli, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme, Comm. Int'l
de Juristes v. Togo (determining based on the findings of a Commission delegation
to Togo that the acts of the prior regime were being remedied by the present
government); see also Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4.
143. In regard to Communication No. 74/92, Commission Nationale des Droits de
l'Homme et des Libertes v. Chad, the Commission expounded on the state duty
specified in Article 1 to give effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
African Charter. According to the Commission, "if a state neglects to ensure the
rights in the African Charter, this can constitute a violation, even if the State or its
agents are not the immediate cause of the violation." Id. 20. The Commission
found that "Chad ha[d] failed to provide security and stability in the country,
thereby allowing serious and massive violations of human rights." Id. 1 22. In
language reminiscent of the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, the Commission said that
"[e]ven where it cannot be proved that violations were committed by government
agents, the government had a responsibility to secure the safety and the liberty of
its citizens, and to conduct investigations into murders. Chad therefore is
responsible for the violations of the African Charter." Id.
144. See Communications Nos. 64/92, 68/92, 78/92, Amnesty Int'l v. Malawi,
reprinted in COMPILATION OF DECISIONS, supra note 139, at 33, 33-35;
Communication No. 74/92, supra note 143; see also Tomasi v. France, 241 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 3, 15-16 (1992).
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concept-that a government's treatment of those within its power
is a matter of international concern. It began, however, with a
modest objective-declaring and defining a set of fundamental
rights, leaving to states the choice of means and policies to
implement the norms. 145 Like standard-setting, human rights
compliance mechanisms and enforcement procedures have evolved
over time and become gradually stronger, at least at the regional
level.
The mechanisms for supervising the U.N. Charter obligations
of member states were initially very limited, because the U.N.
legal office insisted that the U.N. human rights bodies could not
take action with respect to petitions alleging human rights
violations. 146 This left few options for enforcement. This section
looks first at supervision of the U.N. Charter obligations, then at
the U.N. treaty bodies, and finally at the regional mechanisms.
A. United Nations Charter-Based Procedures
Procedures to advance compliance with the U.N. Charter's
human rights obligations range from debates in the General
Assembly, to investigations of particular countries or issues, to
decisions of the Security Council. 147 Most of these techniques have
to be initiated by a member state or group of states and require
the cooperation of other members. 148 In quite a few instances, the
debates have led to investigations or denunciations of human
rights violations in member states, but the political pressure
placed on states sitting on the Commission to vote for or against
such actions has considerably increased in recent years and led to
concerns about the entire process. 49
The enforcement procedures must be considered in the
145. Shelton, supra note 92, at 438-39.
146. ECOSOC, Report of the Sub-Committee on the Handling of
Communications, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/14.Rev. 2 (Feb. 6, 1947).
147. See Antonio Cassese, The General Assembly: Historical Perspective 1945-
1989, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (Philip Alston ed., 1992);
Sydney D. Bailey, The Security Council, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra, at 304.
148. See Cassese, supra note 147; Bailey, supra note 147.
149. See Anne Bayefsky, Editorial, Ending Bias in the Human Rights System,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at A27 ("A United Nations high commissioner for human
rights will always need to withstand political pressure from member states to
engage in a highly selective application of human rights norms.'); Jonathan
Fanton, Taking Human Rights Seriously, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 2006, at C17
("Politics, which should not be a consideration, have come too often to dominate the
[U.N. Human Rights] Commission's work.").
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context of the U.N. Charter as a multilateral treaty. The Charter
contains numerous references to human rights but only expressly
mentions two: the right to self-determination 150 and the right to
non-discrimination. 151 One of the U.N. Charter's objectives is "to
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 152
Furthermore, all but one time that the phrase "human rights and
fundamental freedoms" appears in the Charter, appended to it are
the words "without discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
language or religion."153 The combined focus on equality and self-
determination has directed much of the work of the U.N. political
bodies on human rights issues.154 While it is an intensely political
topic, the U.N.'s focus on equality and self-determination has its
roots firmly in the language of the treaty.
The human rights provisions in the U.N. Charter had an
immediate effect on colonial peoples, who seized on the language
concerning human rights, self-determination, and non-
discrimination to demand decolonization. 55 The birth of the U.N.
in fact coincided with the stirrings of colonial peoples restive under
foreign domination.15 6 By 1960, the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples directly called for
the end of colonialism based on the right of peoples to self-
determination. 157 A decade later, the U.N. General Assembly
affirmed that any subjection of peoples to alien domination and
exploitation constitutes not only a violation of the principle of self-
determination, but of fundamental human rights and of the
Charter.15 8 It is no accident that through much of its history the
U.N.'s predominant human rights focus has been on the right to
self-determination.
The U.N. Charter references to equal rights allowed NGOs
150. U.N. Charter art. 1, 2; id. art. 55.
151. U.N. Charter art. 1, 1 2 ("without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion").
152. Id.
153. See U.N. Charter.
154. See Cassese, supra note 147, at 36-37.
155. See LAUREN, supra note 85, at 206-07.
156. See id. at 205-07.
157. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960).
158. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121, U.N. Doc. A18028 (Oct. 24, 1970); see
also ICESCR, supra note 84, art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 1.
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and governments to speak out against systematic discrimination
from the outset. 159 India, for example, criticized segregation in the
United States, which responded by pointing to the caste system in
India.160 During the first session of the U.N. General Assembly,
Egypt, supported by Latin American states, introduced a
resolution, which passed unanimously, to condemn racial and
religious persecution.1 61  India then sought a resolution to
condemn South Africa for its policies of racial discrimination,
accusing the government of gross and systematic human rights
violations in breach of the principles and purposes of the
Charter. 62 The resolution passed with the required two-thirds
majority, despite opposition from Australia, Great Britain,
Canada, and the United States, each of which had its own racial
policies that contravened the Charter guarantees. 163 The first
session of the General Assembly also declared genocide a crime
under international law.164
In subsequent sessions, specific allegations of human rights
violations were brought against Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary,' 65
and the Soviet Union.166 Other member states pressed for action
on sex discrimination: the Economic and Social Council
("ECOSOC") voted to create the Commission on the Status of
Women, 167 and the General Assembly urged states to grant
political rights to women. 168 In 1949, the General Assembly
declared that measures taken by the Soviet Union to prevent the
wives of citizens of other nationalities from leaving in order to join
159. See LAUREN, supra note 85, at 207.
160. See id.
161. G.A. Res. 103 (1), at 200, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1031 (Nov. 19, 1946).
162. Letter from the Indian Delegation to the Sec'y Gen. of the United Nations,
U.N. Doc. A/149 (June 22, 1946).
163. See G.A. Res. 44(l), at 69, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 8, 1946). The issue of
South Africa's racial policies remained on the agenda of the U.N. in every session
until the end of apartheid.
164. G.A. Res. 96 (I), at 188-89, U.N. Doc. A]64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
165. Australia and Bolivia requested that the General Assembly consider the
question of the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
religious and civil liberties, in Bulgaria and Hungary. See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Annex, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/820 (Mar. 16, 1949); U.N. GAOR 3d Sess., Annex, at 31-
32, U.N. Doc. A/821 (Mar. 19, 1949); U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Annex, at 35-36, U.N.
Doc. A/829 (Apr. 9, 1949). The General Assembly took up Romania during the
fourth session. See U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Annex, at 1 (Sept. 21, 1949).
166. G.A. Res. 285 (III), at 34, U.N. Doc. A/900 (Apr. 25, 1949).
167. ECOSOC, Resolution Establishing the Commission on the Status of
Women, U.N. Doc. E/RES/2/11 (June 21, 1946).
168. G.A. Res. 56 (I), at 90, U.N. Doc. Ai64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946).
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their husbands was not in conformity with the U.N. Charter.' 69 In
1959, 1961, and 1965, the General Assembly condemned violations
of human rights in Tibet. 170 By the 1980s, the General Assembly
was taking up human rights violations in Kampuchea, 171
Guatemala, 172  Chile, 173  El Salvador, 174  and Afghanistan. 175
Indeed, human rights issues have always been on the agenda of
the General Assembly, its committees, or ECOSOC.
Does empirical evidence support the claim of bias in
enforcement? Jack Donnelly's review of thirty years of human
rights discussion in the General Assembly and ECOSOC assessed
the amount of time devoted to debating human rights practices in
South Africa, Israel, and Chile compared to other countries.' 76 He
concluded that there was considerable bias, although it was
declining in the 1980s.177
Donnelly's conclusion assumes that there is no principled
basis for singling out these countries. His study adopts the UDHR
and the Covenants, rather than the U.N. Charter, as the central
normative instruments representing "an authoritative
international expression of the human rights obligations of
contemporary states."'178 However, the Covenants have their own
supervisory bodies and procedure, and therefore it is not the role of
the General Assembly or ECOSOC to enforce them. Few
commentators or states would take the Covenants in their entirety
to represent customary international law. The U.N. organs
concerned with human rights are monitoring compliance with the
obligations of member states under the U.N. Charter.
As noted earlier, the U.N. Charter contains only two specific
rights: the equal rights and self-determination of peoples and the
right of individuals to be free from discrimination. 179 If these
169. See G.A. Res. 285 (III), supra note 166.
170. G.A. Res. 1353 (XIV), at 61, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Oct. 21, 1959); G.A. Res.
4723 (XVI), at 66, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (Dec. 20, 1961); G.A. Res. 2079 (XX), at 3, U.N.
Doc. A16014 (Dec. 18, 1965).
171. G.A. Res. 38/3, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/3 (Oct. 27, 1983).
172. G.A. Res. 38/100, at 203, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/100 (Dec. 16, 1983).
173. G.A. Res. 38/102, at 205, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/102 (Dec. 16, 1983).
174. G.A. Res. 38/101, at 204, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/101 (Dec. 16, 1983).
175. G.A. Res. 37/37, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/37 (Nov. 29, 1982).
176. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights at the United Nations, 1955-1985: The
Question ofBias, 32 INTL STUD. Q. 275, 277-96 (1988).
177. Id. at 275.
178. Id. at 276.
179. See supra notes 150-154 and accompanying text. Donnelly notes the focus
on racial discrimination and self-determination in the U.N., but he attributes it to
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Charter-based rights are indeed the proper focus of U.N. efforts,
then there may be a rational basis for at least two of the three
countries mentioned. In fact, Donnelly himself points to the fact
that racial discrimination was the most discussed topic, taking up
almost as much time as all other civil and political rights
combined.18 0 He also notes that the right to self-determination
received more attention than other topics, "despite the nearly
complete decolonization of the Third World" by 1980. 181 Arguably,
though, the fact of South African (and Namibian), Angolan,
Mozambiquean, and Southern Rhodesian intransigence could very
well explain why the U.N. concentrated on them. The
overwhelming acceptance of decolonization made those few
remaining racist colonial regimes appear particularly odious.
Certainly, South Africa was long a pariah state at the U.N.
The question of discrimination in South Africa was the first
human rights issue taken up by the U.N. General Assembly,
beginning in 1946.182 The General Assembly was originally
concerned with the treatment of the Indian minority, but it
expanded its examination after South Africa elected the
nationalist government that officially instituted apartheid.18 3 In
1953 the General Assembly found that the racial policies of the
Government of South Africa and their consequences were contrary
to the U.N. Charter, a finding that was repeated with increasing
emphasis over the years.18 4  Nearly a decade after the first
condemnation, in 1962, the General Assembly established a
permanent organ, the Special Committee on the policies of
apartheid of the Government of South Africa, with the mandate to
keep the racial policies of South Africa under review when the
the growing presence of the Afro-Asian bloc of countries. Donnelly, supra note 176,
at 277.
180. Donnelly, supra note 176, at 277.
181. Id.
182. A list of all resolutions from the General Assembly's first session in 1946 is
available at http://www.un.org/documents (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
183. See G.A. Res. 44 (I), supra note 163; G.A. Res. 616, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/2361
(Dec. 5, 1952).
184. See G.A. Res. 721 (VIII), at 6, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (Dec. 8, 1953); G.A. Res. 820
(IX), at 9, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (Dec. 14, 1954); G.A. Res. 917 (X), at 8, U.N. Doc.
A13116 (Dec. 6, 1955); G.A. Res. 1016 (XI), at 5, U.N. Doc. A/3572 (Jan. 30, 1957);
G.A. Res. 1178 (XII), at 7, U.N. Doc. A/3805 (Nov. 26, 1957); G.A. Res. 1248 (XII), at
7, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (Oct. 30, 1958); G.A. Res. 1375 (XIII), at 7, U.N. Doc. A/4354
(Nov. 17, 1959); G.A. Res. 1598 (XIV), at 5, U.N. Doc. A/4684/Add.1 (Apr. 15, 1961);
G.A. Res. 1663 (XV), at 10, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (Nov. 28, 1961); G.A. Res. 1761 (XVII),
at 9, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Nov. 6, 1962).
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Assembly was not in session.18 5
South Africa not only deliberately violated the clear U.N.
Charter language of equality by denying human rights to the
majority of its own population, but it challenged the authority of
the U.N. by moving to introduce its racist policies into South West
Africa, a League of Nations Mandate that had been under South
African supervision 8 6 In Resolution 2145 (XXI) of October 27,
1966, the General Assembly, "[c]onvinced that the administration
of the Mandated Territory [of South West Africa] by South Africa
has been conducted in a manner contrary to the Mandate, the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights," declared "that South Africa has failed to fulfil its
obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated
Territory [of South West Africa] and to ensure the moral and
material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of
South West Africa and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate."'8 7
The General Assembly further decided that the Mandate conferred
upon South Africa "is therefore terminated" and "that South Africa
has no other right to administer the Territory.. . ."188 In a 1971
advisory opinion, the I.C.J. agreed that South Africa had
committed a material breach of its obligations, that the
supervisory powers of the Council of the League of Nations had
passed to the General Assembly, and that the General Assembly in
terminating the Mandate had acted within the framework of its
competence.' 8 9 The court said that South Africa had pledged itself
to observe and respect, in a territory having an international
status, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race. 90 To deny those rights on the basis of race
constituted "a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of
the Charter."' 9'
The topic of Israel also arose in reference to a failed Mandate
and continued as repeated conflicts broke out in the region.' 92 The
185. G.A. Res. 1761 (XVII), supra note 184.




189. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 46-47 (June 21).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 57.
192. G.A. Res. 181 (II), at 131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947).
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Israel situation, therefore, has an international dimension that
provides important context for some of the attention given to it.
Like South Africa in Namibia, Israel's occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip after the 1967 War has been seen as a form
of colonial domination, however valid the security justifications
Israel has invoked. 193 While there are undoubtedly other, baser
motives to which some of the attention can be attributed,194 the
ability to place the occupied territories under the Charter's rubric
of self-determination clearly influenced states to vote for some of
the resolutions and keep Israel on the U.N.'s agenda.
Donnelly correctly points to a disproportionate consideration
of civil and political rights compared to economic, social, and
cultural rights during the period he examined. 95 This actually
seems to contradict the perception of critics that the U.N. reflected
a pro-Third World, Soviet agenda, because the Soviet Union placed
clear emphasis on economic and social rights. Donnelly found that
economic, social, and cultural rights were not discussed at all in
the second decade of the U.N. (1955-1965) and claims that their
absence reflected a Western bias.196 This may very well be the
case, or it may be that most of the economic rights that took high
priority at that time (for example, trade union freedoms and
education) were relegated to the specialized agencies (for example,
ILO and UNESCO) with greater expertise in handling them.
Donnelly found that personal security issues (for example,
right to life, freedom from torture, and protection against slavery)
also dominated the agenda. 197  He calls this a "disturbing
pattern,"'198 but these are non-derogable, fundamental rights that
cannot be suspended even during times of emergency. 99 They
constitute customary international law and are referred to by
many as "jus cogens" or "peremptory rights."200 It should not be
193. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/82, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/82 (Dec. 16, 1992)
(noting that Palestinian people are under "colonial domination").
194. See Donnelly, supra note 176, at 290-91.
195. Id. at 279.
196. Id. at 281.
197. Id. at 282.
198. Id.
199. ICCPR, supra note 9.
200. Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L
L. 291, 302-05 (2006). For a judicial declaration that the prohibition of torture
constitutes jus cogens, see Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1-T, 153-54




surprising that they are discussed more often than other rights.
In fact, Donnelly's study may reflect a more legal approach to
monitoring compliance with the U.N. Charter's human rights
obligations than is usually perceived.
Another study, limited to resolutions of the Human Rights
Commission condemning states for systematic violations between
1982 and 1997, found that the Commission singled out twenty-two
countries over this time period.201 The most frequently condemned
countries were Iraq, Iran, Equatorial Guinea, Cuba, and Haiti.20 2
These states hardly count as beacons of liberty, so the criticism
seems to be not who was included, but who was excluded. For
example, there have been eleven attempts to condemn China,
widely considered to be a serious human rights violator, but each
attempt has been defeated. 20 3
In sum, the focus of condemnation has been on gross
violations of core civil and political rights, particularly in the
colonial context or when racial discrimination has been at issue. 20 4
No state has been condemned for economic deprivations. It must
be kept in mind, however, that these are not the policies of the
U.N., but of its members. They choose to raise or not to raise the
issue of human rights violations in other countries for a variety of
reasons, including domestic politics, ideological differences,
strategic interests, and, on occasion, altruism. States that are
targets of censure often cry "double standard" where in earlier
years they would have invoked "exclusive domestic jurisdiction."
States lobby to find supporters in order to avoid censure. 20 5 States
learn to use the system. 206
If states are reluctant to complain of human rights violations
by others in the club, victims and their representatives have no
such reticence. Still, the treatment of victims' complaints may
also indicate bias. Until 1959, the U.N. received and considered
201. Ron Wheeler, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1982-
1997: A Study of "Targeted" Resolutions, 32 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 75, 81 (1999).
202. Id. at 101.
203. Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double
Standard?, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 72 (2005).
204. See U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess., 2d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1992/SR.2 (Apr.
13, 1993) (criticizing the emphasis on civil and political rights).
205. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE LIMITS OF COMPLIANCE 49-83 (1999) (arguing that China used its political and
economic power to defeat efforts to condemn its human rights record at the U.N.).
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only petitions from non-self-governing territories; 2 7 other claims
of violations were met with silence.208 ECOSOC began to open the
door more widely with a resolution that permitted the U.N.
Human Rights Commission to review summaries of
communications received by the U.N. Secretary-General about
human rights violations. 209 The resolution, however, denied the
Commission the power to take any action. 210 After a controversial
1966 I.C.J. judgment concerning South Africa,211 ECOSOC
changed its mind. In 1967, with Resolution 1235, it approved the
Commission adding a new agenda item, "Question of the violation
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of
racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all
countries, with particular reference to colonial and other
dependent countries and territories."212 There was no doubt about
the focus of attention, because the resolution expressly mentioned
207. Article 87(b) of the U.N. Charter provides that the Trusteeship Council has
authority to accept and examine petitions concerning trust territories. U.N.
Charter art. 87(b). The last trusteeship terminated in 1994, and the Council no
longer meets regularly. Letter from the President of the Trusteeship Council to the
President of the Sec. Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1234 (Nov. 3, 1994). In 1961, the
General Assembly created the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to
the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples. G.A. Res. 1654 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1654(XVI) (Nov. 27,
1961). The Special Committee may receive petitions from individuals and groups
and, with the permission of the administering state, conduct on-site visits to
territories. See DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., UNITED NATIONS AND DECOLONIZATION 6
(2005), available at http://www.un.orglDeptsldpi/decolonization/
Decolonization-brochure.pdf. Sixteen non-self-governing territories remain within
its mandate. Press Release, Gen. Assembly, Decolonization United Nations
Success Story, Albeit Unfinished One, Deputy Secretary-General Tells Special
Committee (Feb. 22, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/News/Pressl
docs/2007/gacol3151.doc.htm.
208. It is estimated that in the 1940s and 1950s, some 20,000 human rights
complaints a year were received at the U.N. Philip Alston, The Commission on
Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 126,
146. In 1948, the "paradox" of individuals in trusteeships having the right to
petition, while those in the administering territories lacked the right, was noted
during discussions in the General Assembly's Third Committee. See John Carey,
The United Nations' Double Standard on Human Rights Complaints, 60 AM. J.
INT'L L. 792, 792 (1966) (citing U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 3d Comm. at 699, U.N. Doc.
AIC.3/SR.158 (1948)).
209. ECOSOC Res. 728F, 1-2, U.N. Doc. E/3290 (July 30, 1959).
210. Id.
211. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Mr.) (Second Phase),
1966 I.C.J. 4 (July 18). The court was evenly divided, and its president cast a
deciding vote to reject the claims against South Africa because Ethiopia and
Liberia lacked standing. Id. at 49. This decision effectively terminated the
litigation and allowed South Africa to escape condemnation on the merits.
212. ECOSOC Res. 1235, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (June 6, 1967).
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South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. 213  The resolution also
authorized the Commission and Sub-Commission to examine
information relevant to gross violations of human rights.2 14 The
Commission could then "in appropriate cases, and after careful
consideration.., make a thorough study of situations which
reveal a consistent pattern of violations of human rights, as
exemplified by... apartheid... and racial discrimination," and
report and make recommendations to ECOSOC.215
Pursuant to Resolution 1235, the Commission began to
examine Southern Africa and the territories occupied by Israel
during and after the 1967 War.216 Chile, after the September 11,
1973, military coup, became the first situation on the agenda that
was not part of what the majority of the Commission considered to
be colonialism. 217 Each case was taken up on the understanding
that it would not create a precedent for broader human rights
investigations.218 By the end of the decade, however, pressure
from NGOs and the human rights initiatives of the Carter
administration caused the procedure to be opened up.219 As of the
creation of the Human Rights Council in 2006, the Commission
had under study fourteen countries: Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cuba, Democratic Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Myanmar, the Israeli-occupied territories,
Somalia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan. 220  Three of these states,
Belarus, Korea, and Iran, were condemned by the General
Assembly for human rights violations in December 2006.221 Few
would argue that these states did not deserve to be censured.
Many other countries are addressed by the thematic rapporteurs
and working groups that the Commission authorized and the




216. Alston, supra note 208, at 157.
217. Id. at 158.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 159.
220. U.N. Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Report on the Sixty-Second Session, at 1-2,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/122 (Mar. 13-27, 2006).
221. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts 46 Third
Committee Texts on Human Rights Issues, Refugees, Self-Determination, Racism,
Social Development, U.N. Doc. GA110562 (Dec. 19, 2006) (summarizing General
Assembly Resolutions 61/174, 61/175, and 61/176).
222. See generally A United Nations Priority-United Nations Human Rights
Monitoring Mechanisms, at http://www.un.org/rights/HRTodaythrmm.htm (last
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In 1970, ECOSOC further expanded the process when it
adopted Resolution 1503 (XLVIII),223 which finally authorized the
Commission and Sub-Commission to examine communications
submitted to the U.N.224 Numerous restrictions were placed on
this limited petition procedure: the examination had to be taken in
closed session; 225 the consideration was limited to situations that
appeared to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably
attested violations of human rights;226 no hearings or redress were
afforded the petitioner; and the outcome was limited to a thorough
study or an investigation "with the express consent of the state
concerned." 227
Although the origins of the approval stemmed from efforts to
combat colonialism and racism in Southern Africa, 228 other victims
of widespread violations began filing complaints. It is important
to remember that the Sub-Commission had no independent
authority to identify violators, but depended on the
communications brought to it.229 Despite the secrecy enjoined by
ECOSOC, the names of the targeted countries quickly became
public. 230 In 1972, Greece, Iran, and Portugal were referred to the
Sub-Commission, which very cautiously referred them back to the
working group because their respective governments had not
replied. 231 In addition, the Sub-Commission members probably
noted that although Portugal was a colonial power, as the original
sponsors of the resolution intended, the other two cases concerned
widespread violations by a type of dictatorial government common
throughout the world. 232 This made the procedure potentially
dangerous to many states. Nonetheless, the following year, the
Sub-Commission found the courage to refer eight countries to the
visited Mar. 19, 2007). The rapporteurs and members of the working groups serve
in their individual capacities. Id.




227. Id. 7(a). The procedure was revised in 2000 to reduce the role of the
independent Sub-Commission and enhance the role of the political Commission.
ECOSOC Res. 2000/3, U.N. Doc. E/2000/99 (June 16, 2000).
228. See Alston, supra note 208, at 143-44 (describing how international efforts
to eliminate South Africa's colonialism and racism in the 1960s led ECOSOC to
adopt Resolution 1503).
229. ECOSOC Res. 1503, supra note 223, 1.
230. See Alston, supra note 208, at 148.
231. Id. at 148-49.
232. Id. at 148.
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Commission: Brazil, Britain, Burundi, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran,
Portugal, and Tanzania. 233 The confidentiality of the procedure
precludes public knowledge about the existence of communications
alleging widespread violations against other countries; they may
have been absent from the list because no communications had
been filed. Despite the evidence reported by the Sub-Commission,
the Commission took no action on any of the countries.
The Resolution 1503 procedure thus began slowly, but by
2005, it had resulted in the examination of eighty-four countries in
all regions of the world.234 Nonetheless, political considerations
kept several major cases off the Commission's agenda, despite
referrals from the Sub-Commission. 235 The procedure is hampered
by the fact that it ends up before a political body, by the length of
time it takes to obtain results, and by the limited options for
responding when systematic violations are found. This does not
mean that the procedure lacks standards or that it has a double
standard. Both Resolution 1235 and Resolution 1503 are clear on
the threshold for action: gross and systematic violations of
internationally-guaranteed human rights. 236  This threshold
reflects a decision by the U.N. member states to set the standard
for what constitutes a material breach of the U.N. Charter. It is
the application of the standard in a political context that is the
root of the problem.
B. Global and Regional Treaty Bodies
U.N. human rights treaties create specific monitoring bodies,
which are usually committees of independent experts that meet in
two to three sessions a year.237  The ICCPR, for example,
establishes a Human Rights Committee of eighteen independent
experts that may review the periodic reports states submit
233. HOWARD TOLLEY, THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 77, 128 (1987).
234. Commission on Human Rights, States Examined Under the 1503
Procedure, http://www.ohchr.org/englishfbodies/chr/statl.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2007).
235. The most notorious case is probably that of Uganda under President Idi
Amin. Between 1974 and 1978, the Sub-Commission placed the case on the
Commission's agenda, but no action was taken. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 22, at 149. By the time the
Commission decided to act and send a confidential envoy, Amin had been
overthrown. Id.
236. See supra notes 215 & 226 and accompanying text.
237. See generally Alston, supra note 208, at 337-508.
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assessing their own performance. 238  Article 41 gives the
Committee jurisdiction to accept inter-state complaints if the
states concerned have made a declaration allowing the Committee
to receive such complaints.239  States accepting the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR further grant the Committee the power to
receive individual communications, but it cannot issue binding
decisions, much less enforce them. 240
In all the regional bodies, as in the global system, inter-state
cases are exceptionally rare. The European system has had fewer
than two dozen cases filed by state parties. 241 The African system
has received only one inter-state case in its history,242 and the
Inter-American system recently declared inadmissible its first
inter-state case.243 States also show no inclination to denounce
others before U.N. treaty bodies or the I.C.J. Instead, human
rights issues are generally raised for political reasons before
political bodies.
It should not be surprising that governments in power rarely
take up the cases of those without power in other states, since the
governments often fail victims even within their own borders.
Taking a home-grown example, in the infamous Dred Scott v.
Sandford judgment upholding slavery in 1857, the United States
Supreme Court determined that the "unfortunate race" of Africans
"had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."244
Nearly a century after the Civil War and the adoption of
constitutional amendments eradicating slavery, segregation
remained the law of the land in most states, and the federal
government took no action to enforce the constitutional
guarantees. 245 Only the courageous efforts of the victims of racist
238. ICCPR, supra note 9, at 56.
239. Id. at 57.
240. Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, supra note 9, at 59.
241. See European Court of Human Rights Home Page-List of Judgments,
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/ (follow "Case-Law" hyperlink; then follow "Lists of
Judgments" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
242. Communication No. 227/99, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi,
Rwanda & Uganda.
243. Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-state Case 01/06, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 11/07 (Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.cidh.org/INTER-
STATE%20CASE%201-06.pdf.
244. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
245. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE
DESEGREGATION OF SOUTHERN TRANSIT 1-19 (1983) (describing segregation by law
of public transit, which was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
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laws, through litigation and eventually civil disobedience,
ultimately led the reluctant and sometimes recalcitrant
government to enforce the standards set decades earlier.246 If the
standards had not been set or if African-Americans had lacked
recourse to federal courts, progress undoubtedly would have been
vastly slower. Like federal courts during the civil rights
movement, international human rights bodies provide recourse
when the laws and institutions of the states fail to respect
internationally-guaranteed human rights, but unfortunately, only
when the states have accepted the relevant treaties.
The procedures for reviewing state compliance are set forth
in the treaties and almost always include state self-reporting.
Among the major U.N. treaties, the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of
Punishment,247 the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families,248 the International Convention on the CERD,249 and the
ICCPR250 also provide for inter-state complaints, but only CERD
requires that its committee address the complaint. 251 All of the
other treaties require a separate acceptance of the possibility of
inter-state complaints. 252 No inter-state complaint has ever been
filed under any of the treaties. 253
The first U.N. human rights treaty containing a petition
process, CERD, required a separate declaration by states parties
to accept the procedure set forth in Article 14.254 The ICCPR,
246. For a description of civil rights actions by the NAACP from its founding in
February 1910, see HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF RACISM IN AMERICA (1998). The organization initially sought to
end lynchings in the South. Id. at 23. It is notable that a 1930 grant from the
American Fund for Public Service gave the NAACP the resources for a broader
legal campaign to secure the constitutional rights of African-Americans. Id. at 35.
Foundations today also play an important role in financing the enforcement efforts
of human rights and humanitarian NGOs.
247. Torture Convention, supra note 71, art. 21.
248. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and their Families art. 76, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec.
18, 1990).
249. CERD, supra note 82, art. 11.
250. ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 41(1)(a).
251. CERD, supra note 82, art. 11.
252. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 41(1)(a).
253. The reluctance of states to file formal complaints is also attested to by the
fact that the Constitution of the ILO established an inter-state complaint
mechanism that has been used only six times since 1919. I.L.O. CONST. arts. 26-34.
254. CERD, supra note 82, art. 14.
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adopted one year later, was even less accepting of petitions in that
it included the possibility of individual "communications" in an
Optional Protocol requiring separate ratification. 25 5  The
independent Human Rights Committee has jurisdiction to receive
communications from victims against a state that has accepted
both the treaty and the protocol, but its action is limited to
reviewing the written record and issuing "views."256 Many U.N.
treaties were initially adopted without even this limited petition
procedure, but some of them have been supplemented by later
instruments allowing complaints. 257
At the regional level, the European system reflects the
evolution toward stronger international supervision of treaty
obligations. The "default setting" for the original 1950 ECHR's
supervisory machinery was an inter-state complaint brought to
the European Commission on Human Rights. 258 The Commission
could investigate the situation, attempt a friendly settlement, and
ultimately report the matter to the Committee of Ministers, a
political body.259 The Committee of Ministers would then decide if
a violation had taken place. 260 The ECHR allowed submission of
an individual petition only if the state in question had filed
optional declarations accepting both the right of individual
petition and the jurisdiction of the court.261 In such case, an
individual petition could be brought before the former
Commission, which would judge its admissibility and then report
on its evaluation of admissible cases.262 If the contracting party
had accepted the court's jurisdiction, the state or the Commission
could thereafter choose to bring the matter back before the
court. 26 3 The individual had no standing to refer the case.
Over time, this procedure was supplanted by increasing
acceptance of individual complaints and recourse to the court.264
Today, with the revisions of Protocol 11, the Commission no longer
255. Optional Protocol to the ICCPR art. 2, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), at 59, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
256. Id. art. 5.
257. E.g., id.
258. Id. art. 48.
259. Id. art. 28.
260. Id. art. 32.
261. ECHR, supra note 65, art. 34.
262. Id. arts. 29-30.
263. Id. art. 44.
264. See Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR, May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. 155
(restructuring the control machinery established therein).
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exists, 265 the right of petition to the court is automatic,266 and all
members of the Council of Europe can be bound by judicial
decisions enforced by the Committee of Ministers. 26 7 Similarly,
the Inter-American and the African systems establish the right of
individual petition against member states with no separate
declaration required. 26 8 Both also have regional human rights
courts.
2 6 9
Despite the independent judicial and quasi-judicial bodies at
the regional level, concerns about a double standard of
enforcement have also arisen, at least in Europe. On the one
hand, critics of the court have suggested that the judges are
employing less exacting standards when addressing violations by
the new member states, a charge the judges vigorously deny.2 70
On the other hand, the new members themselves object to new
monitoring procedures that are not part of the judicial process. 271
New countries in the Council of Europe272 are subject to political
monitoring to ensure respect for human rights and fulfillment of
other obligations of membership. 273 All applicant states must
commit to ratification of the ECHR, but the process of gaining
membership also typically results in the applicant state
committing to internal reforms in law and practice. 274 Fulfillment
of these commitments is monitored through special procedures,
265. Id. pmbl.
266. Id. art. 34.
267. Id. art. 48.
268. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 57, art. 25; Protocol to
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights art. 5, O.A.U. Doc.
CABJLEG/63/3rev. 5 (June 10, 1998).
269. See generally American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 57;
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, supra
note 268.
270. LuzIus WILDHABER, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1998-2006:
HISTORY, ACHIEVEMENTS, REFORM 64 (2006).
271. See Vessela V. Stoyanova, The Council of Europe's Monitoring Mechanisms
and Their Relation to Eastern European Member States' Noncompliance, 45 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 739, 748-53, 765-68 (2005).
272. The Council of Europe has forty-six member states, almost half of which are
in Central and Eastern Europe and joined after 1991. The Council of Europe's
Member States, http://www.coe.intlT/e/com/about coe/member-states/default.asp
(last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
273. Membership is conditioned on commitment to representative democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law. Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 64,
art. 5.
274. Stoyanova, supra note 271, at 744-45.
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primarily under the authority of the Parliamentary Assembly.275
A state that failed to meet membership commitments or other
obligations under the Council's Statute, including through serious
violations of human rights, could face suspension or revocation of
its membership. 276 Some commentators have argued that the
procedures unfairly single out new members for review, while the
original members escape extensive monitoring, and that such a
double standard at least partly contributes to noncompliance by
new member states. 277
While it is true that older member states are not subject to
the same review, 278 it is also true that many of the new member
states entered the system with little experience with democracy or
human rights.279 The monitoring procedure is at least in part
designed to provide technical assistance to governments emerging
from a period of repression. 280 It is probably also the case that
without a monitoring system, at least some of the new member
states would not have been admitted to the Council. 281
The European and other regional systems are in danger of
becoming victims of their own success. The financial resources
and personnel are inadequate to address the continually rising
275. In 1997, the Parliamentary Assembly created a Committee on the
Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of
Europe. EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. 1115 (Jan. 29, 1997). The Committee's mandate
focuses on monitoring compliance with obligations and commitments of new
member states. Id. In the field of human rights, the Committee examines the
internal legal order of the state, its judicial system, policing, prison conditions,
privacy and family life, civil and political freedoms, property rights, equality
between men and women, treatment of minorities, and measures against racism,
anti-Semitism, and xenophobia. See Jan Kleijssen, The Monitoring Procedure of
the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
MONITORING MECHANISMS, supra note 88, at 623.
276. Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 64, art. 8.
277. See, e.g., Stoyanova, supra note 271, at 739-40 (positing that the structure
and practices of the Council of Europe are partially responsible for noncompliance).
Stoyanova also argues that the inability of Eastern European countries to
participate in the drafting the ECHR contributes to a sense of Western European
imposition. Id. at 758. However, all the rights in the ECHR come from the UDHR;
the new member states contributed to and voted for the adoption of the UDHR.
They also contributed to elaboration of and ratified the U.N. Covenants on Human
Rights.
278. Id. at 746.
279. Id. at 756-57.
280. Id. at 746.
281. Id.; see Peter Leuprecht, Innovations in the European System of Human
Rights Protection: Is Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement?, 8 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 313 (1998) (expressing concern about the impact of
enlargement on human rights).
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numbers of cases. The sheer volume of potential complaints from
some of the new member states in Europe calls for a procedure to
address systemic problems and prevent widespread violations
from overwhelming the court. Part of the problem results from
gross and systematic violations that cannot be remedied through
the individual case system. It remains primarily the task of the
U.N. to take action in response to the worst violations.
C. New Institutions and Procedures
The Human Rights Council, like the U.N. Human Rights
Commission, is an elected body of state representatives chosen
according to the principle of equitable geographic
representation. 282 The Secretary-General's High Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges, and Change, which in part led to replacing
the Commission with the Council, noted that states had sought
membership on the Commission not to strengthen human rights,
but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize others.283
It asserted that the Commission could not be credible if it was
seen as maintaining double standards in addressing human rights
concerns. 284 Despite this critique, the new Council is not made up
of independent experts, nor are there criteria governing
membership. 28 5
The political character and membership of the former
Commission did affect its work when it came to targeting
governments for violations. The United States typically sought
resolutions against communist governments like China and Cuba,
while ignoring widespread violations in countries with which it
had economic or security ties, including Iraq in 1989.286 The
presence of violators was not always negative, however. The
Commission was the principal forum to confront governments with
282. G.A. Res 60/251, supra note 13, 7.
283. Chairman, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Change, 282-83, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2,
2004). The U.S. was particularly critical of the Commission after 2001, when it lost
its bid for continued membership on the body and Austria, France, and Sweden
were elected from the Western European and Other group instead. While these
countries cannot be accused of having poor human rights records, the African group
nominated Sudan and it was elected.
284. Chairman, supra note 283, 282-83.
285. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 13.
286. Lawrence Moss, Will the Human Rights Council Have Better Membership
than the Commission on Human Rights?, Human Rights Watch-Backgrounders,
http:///hrw.org/backgrounder/un/un0406/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
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allegations of violations that demanded response.28 7 Nonetheless
the election of states with egregious human rights records
sometimes allowed them to escape condemnation and contributed
to the perception of a double standard, damaging the
Commission.288
A credible human rights system legally binds states to
respect internationally-guaranteed rights and holds governments
accountable when they fail to fulfill their obligations. In this
respect, the new Human Rights Council may not be a major
improvement over the prior Commission. Governments with poor
human rights records are eligible for election, as they were before.
The mandate of the Council may be an improvement over the
prior system, however. In addition to addressing gross and
systematic violations, the Council is to scrutinize the human
rights record of every member of the U.N.289 This peer review
process is akin to expanding the treaty-based reporting system
and "constructive dialogue" to all states. The Council is charged
with assessing compliance with human rights obligations based on
"objective and reliable information," ensuring "universality of
coverage and equal treatment" of all states.290 It is intended to be
fair, transparent, and effective, but its workings will largely
depend on the composition of the Council. Moreover, it is unlikely
that the Council will have sufficient meeting time to fulfill its
mandate.
Conclusion
International organizations have no policy. Human rights
enforcement is instead the combination of the foreign policies of
the member states played out in multilateral fora. These policies
are rarely neutral and altruistic; indeed, it has been argued that
any human rights policy that does not enhance national security is
unjustifiable. 291 United States policy, for example, has fluctuated
among a number of different approaches. The Reagan
administration overtly applied a double standard that took a much
harder line on "totalitarian" regimes of the left than
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 13, art. 5(e).
290. Id.




"authoritarian" regimes of the right.292 Critics argued that a policy
reversal would be more successful, because it would focus on those
countries with which the United States has greater leverage due
to economic and other incentives. 293 President Carter, by contrast,
was criticized for not being selective. 294
What is wrong with a double standard? It is bad for human
rights, because it often causes a backlash that threatens human
rights or denies the legitimacy of any investigation of alleged
violations. It may create tensions and bad relations that
undermine constructive efforts to promote human rights. The
public may withdraw support for NGOs, international institutions,
and governments that give preferential treatment to one set of
violators over another. Ideally, then, human rights violations
should be treated evenhandedly-but when political, economic,
and other resources are limited, choices must be made.
Random enforcement is unlikely to be effective. Extensive
trade, aid, or political ties may allow greater pressure to be placed
on violators, but applying such pressure risks political fallout from
domestic interests that gain from ongoing economic relations.
Allies are willing to hear criticism that adversaries would reject.
It is also important for a government to disassociate itself from
violators, and the government may lose little by voting for U.N.
condemnation of violators. Human rights performance will
perform little, however, without the imposition of effective
targeted sanctions, which expends political capital.
Criteria or a single standard for a government to act on
human rights violations could include factors such as past
responsibility for the regime in power; economic or other leverage;
issue linkage; severity of violations; the existence of a better
alternative; and multilateral support. Successfully raising human
rights cases or issues in multilateral political bodies generally
requires a coalition of NGOs, media coverage, and key state
support. It also could be useful if the U.N. viewed itself as having
a stake in the country, for example, because it monitored elections
or sent peacekeepers. What remain debated and probably without
resolution are questions about priorities of rights and countries. In
general, though, it is increasingly acknowledged that there are
292. Id. at 53.
293. Id.
294. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, COMMENTARY,
Nov. 1979, at 34, 44.
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different priorities and interpretations of substantive rights, as
well as different definitions and appreciations of claimed
violations. 295
In the end, it is probably inevitable that each country accused
of human rights violations will claim it is being unfairly singled
out for political purposes. China, when it has been accused of
violations, has responded that it:
has always held that to effect international protection of
human rights, the international community should interfere
with and stop acts that endanger world peace and security,
such as gross human rights violations caused by colonialism,
racism, foreign aggression and occupation, as well as
apartheid, racial discrimination, genocide, slave trade and
serious violation of human rights by terrorist organizations. 296
At the same time, "China has always maintained that human
rights are essentially matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a
country" and that non-interference in internal affairs and respect
for state sovereignty are applicable to the field of human rights. 297
Similarly, United States government officials have claimed that
U.N. investigations into United States practices constitute
harassment.298
The goal of human rights law is to end current violations of
rights and prevent them in the future. Each critique should lead
to a more effective legal system. The international human rights
law system is clearly not responding to some of the most serious
violations today, as in Darfur. Human rights machinery must be
improved to ensure that attention and resources are devoted to
those situations most requiring a response. The problem is, and
likely will remain, political. In The Responsibility to Protect, a
Canadian government initiative concluded that there are criteria
for when intervention by the international community is not just
295. For example, determining that there is systematic religious persecution
depends on deciding that certain groups constitute religions entitled to exercise
religious liberty and not cults or criminal enterprises claiming the mantle of
religion for other purposes. See MARIA HSIA CHANG, FALUN GONG, THE END OF
DAYS (2004) (discussing the Falun Gong and the response of the Chinese
government to its activities); Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and
the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity within
Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 391 (2001).
296. INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., Active Participation in
International Human Rights Activities, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA ART. X (1991),
available at http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/4.html.
297. Id.
298. Betsy Pisik, Human Rights Probes Irk U.S. U.N. Is Harassing, Lawmakers
Charge, WASH. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at Al.
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authorized but required. 299 First, "there must be serious and
irreparable harm occurring to human beings or imminently likely
to occur." 300  The intervention should be for the purpose of
preventing or halting such harm, it should be the last resort, it
should use proportional means, and it should have reasonable
prospects of success. 301 The consequences of action should not be
worse than the consequences of inaction.30 2 The U.N. High Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change agreed that there is a
norm emerging that imposes a collective international
responsibility to protect people in the event of genocide, ethnic
cleansing, other large-scale killing, or other serious violations of
international humanitarian law.30 3 Its criteria for intervention 304
mimicked those of the Canadian report. 30 5
As for further multilateral reform, those concerned with
human rights need to urge the re-establishment of an independent
body similar to the former U.N. Sub-Commission. An institution
that is not made up of state representatives must assess the need
for new standards and identify deficiencies in compliance with
existing ones. In an ideal world, this independent body would
have jurisdiction to investigate allegations of gross and systematic
violations of human rights.
Finally, in the next twenty-five years, this author believes
the following objectives warrant priority consideration.
1. Determine what justice for victims entails and ensure that
it occurs. The recent emphasis on criminal prosecutions on the one
hand and truth commissions on the other sometimes seems to
overlook the needs of survivors. Attention to the needs of the
victims of human rights is beginning to receive greater attention,
but it remains inadequate. A very difficult part of this discussion
must concern how far back to go in redressing past abuses. This is
critical because historical injustices have a way of returning and
becoming present day conflicts.
2. Focus on prevention. Widespread violations of human
299. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/
Commission-Report.pdf.
300. Id. at XII.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Chairman, supra note 283, 201.
304. Id. 207.




rights, like environmental disasters, involve catastrophic and
often irreversible harm. Prevention rather than redress should
therefore be the goal, and devising programs to strengthen respect
for human rights must be a priority.
3. Reconsider the paradigm of human rights guarantees as it
has existed for more than half a century. Violations of human
rights today are not always committed by strong dictatorial
governments in a police state. They are as likely to be committed
by non-state actors in failed states, by powerful private interests
taking over governmental functions through outsourcing and
privatization, or by criminal enterprises. The U.N. and other
inter-governmental organizations also may be implicated in
human rights violations during peace-keeping missions or other
exercises of power.
4. Recognize the intersection of human rights with other
international legal matters. Examples of such matters include
trade and human rights, environment and human rights, and
investment and human rights. It is important to reduce the
compartmentalization of lawmaking and law enforcement.
5. Create regional systems where they currently do not exist.
Regional systems have demonstrated that independent human
rights bodies effectively ensure respect for global human rights
norms. No one should be left without the international safety net
provided by such a system.
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